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i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign
immunity via the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act,
Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990) (“CRCA”),
in providing remedies for authors of original
expression whose federal copyrights are infringed by
States.
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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are scholars of constitutional law, federal
jurisdiction, and civil rights law who have taught and
written about the Eleventh Amendment and state
sovereign immunity for many years. We present this
brief in an effort to make our scholarship and
experience useful to the Court.1
Samuel Bagenstos is the Frank G. Millard
Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, where
he teaches and writes about constitutional law and
civil rights. Professor Bagenstos successfully briefed
and argued United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151
(2006) in this Court.
Neil S. Siegel is the David W. Ichel Professor of
Law and Professor of Political Science at Duke
University, where he teaches and writes about
constitutional law and federal jurisdiction.
Ernest Young is the Alston and Bird Professor of
Law at Duke University, where he teaches
Constitutional Law and Federal Courts. He has
written extensively on this Court’s sovereign
immunity jurisprudence, including how that
jurisprudence bears on federal intellectual property
laws.

All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
Pursuant to Rule 37.6, Amici state that no counsel for any
party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person
or entity, other than Amici or their counsel, has made any
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of
this brief.
1

2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This brief suggests a path for resolving this
important case that is faithful to the Constitution’s
text and history, minimizes disruption to this Court’s
state sovereign immunity jurisprudence, and
maximizes the chance for consensus on the Court. The
key is this Court’s unanimous decision, authored by
Justice Antonin Scalia, in United States v. Georgia,
546 U.S. 151 (2006). Georgia held that federal statutes
abrogating state sovereign immunity are always valid
when invoked by a plaintiff who can establish not only
a statutory violation but also a constitutional one—
whether or not the statute would also be valid if
prophylactically applied to state conduct that is not
unconstitutional. This is the narrowest form of
abrogation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It implements the special concern for
constitutional rights demonstrated by the Framers of
both the original Constitution and the Eleventh and
Fourteenth Amendments. And it follows the teaching
of unanimous Courts in both Georgia and Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), which recognized
Congress’s powers to enforce those rights through
damages remedies even against nonconsenting states.
In presenting this argument, amici do not wish to
undermine or disparage the arguments pressed by
Petitioners and other amici that Congress’s
enumerated power to protect copyrights entails a
waiver of state immunities in the plan of the
Convention. Amici agree that copyright is a strong
candidate for such a waiver under this Court’s
decision in Central Virginia Community College v.
Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). But that argument has been

3
ably presented by Petitioners and others, and amici
believe they can more usefully assist the Court by
offering an alternative ground. Petitioners have
compellingly alleged that North Carolina’s conduct
violated both the Copyright Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Under Georgia,
that is enough to decide this appeal.
But whatever this Court does, it should not extend
the reach of its decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Seminole’s holding—
that Congress generally may not abrogate state
immunity when acting pursuant to its Article I
powers—was unfaithful to the text of Article III or the
Eleventh Amendment, and it overlooked crucial
elements of the relevant history. This case does not
require consideration whether Seminole should be
overruled, because the CRCA satisfies both Katz’s
conditions for waiver and the criteria for abrogation
under Section 5. But this Court should not extend
Seminole by applying it to an important federal
statute, narrowing Katz’s waiver doctrine, or
restricting the scope of permissible abrogation under
Section 5.
ARGUMENT
I. This Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe
should not be extended.
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, this Court held
that Congress generally cannot abrogate the sovereign
immunity of the states when it acts pursuant to its
Article I powers. 517 U.S. at 72-73. Amici believe that
this holding rested on an incorrect reading of the
relevant text and history. Whether or not the costs of

4
that decision overcome the presumption of stare
decisis, however, is a difficult question that this Court
need not consider in order to resolve this case. We
canvass Seminole’s missteps in order to underscore
the importance of not extending its holding.
A. Seminole’s holding did not rest on the
constitutional text.
Article III extends the federal courts’
jurisdiction to “all cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. This
language generally authorizes federal courts to hear
federal statutory claims. Article III says nothing about
sovereign immunity; it neither creates it nor overrides
it, if it can be derived from some other source. The only
textual source for a constitutional doctrine of state
sovereign immunity is the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he
Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI.
Most scholars have read this language to prohibit
federal courts from hearing suits against states only
when jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship;
effectively, the amendment repeals the Citizen-State
Diversity Clauses of Article III when the state is an
unwilling defendant.2 And this Court has
See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an
2
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unanimously agreed with that reading. The Seminole
majority acknowledged that “the text of the
Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article
III diversity jurisdiction,” 517 U.S. at 54, and the
dissenters affirmed that “[t]he history and structure of
the Eleventh Amendment convincingly show that it
reaches only to suits subject to federal jurisdiction
exclusively under the Citizen–State Diversity
Clauses,” id. at 110 (Souter, J., dissenting). Writing
for the majority in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999), Justice Kennedy candidly acknowledged that
the phrase “Eleventh Amendment immunity” is
“something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity
of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by,
the terms of the Eleventh Amendment,” id. at 713.

Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition
against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1982); John J.
Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889
(1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L. J.
1 (1988). The most significant scholarly disagreement
about the text concerns whether it bars all cases in which
diversity is present, or only those in which diversity is the
sole basis of jurisdiction. Compare Lawrence C. Marshall,
Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1342 (1989) (arguing that the “plain meaning”
forbids jurisdiction over even federal question cases if the
plaintiff is an out-of-stater), with William A. Fletcher, The
Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply
to Critics, 56 U CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989) (defending the
diversity reading). That difference is irrelevant to this case
because Petitioners are citizens of North Carolina.

6
The state sovereign immunity doctrine has existed
apart from the constitutional text at least since Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), for instance, this
Court said that “[m]anifestly, we cannot rest with a
mere literal application of the words of § 2 of Article
III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh
Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits
against nonconsenting States. Behind the words of the
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit
and control,” id. at 321. But until Seminole Tribe,
those penumbral “postulates” had never been allowed
to do what only a constitutional principle can do:
trump the clear mandate of a duly-enacted federal
statute that explicitly overrode state sovereign
immunity.
Seminole’s
reach
beyond
the
Eleventh
Amendment’s text is particularly troubling given that
text’s highly specific nature. As John Manning has
documented, “the Eleventh Amendment appears to
have offered a carefully circumscribed answer to the
larger question of how much sovereign immunity
states should possess against the exercise of Article III
jurisdiction.”3 Because the amendment process is
designed to allow electoral minorities to force
compromise, Dean Manning points out, interpreters
“must be sensitive to the possibility that the
Amendment’s precise enumeration of exceptions to the
grant of Article III power carries a negative
John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the
Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L. J.
1663, 1748 (2004).
3
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implication, the product of an apparent decision to go
so far and no farther in defining the desired exceptions
to federal jurisdiction.”4 Hence, courts “must not
readjust the Amendment’s precise terms to capture
their apparent background purpose.”5 State sovereign
immunity, in other words, should have constitutional
weight only in those cases falling within the Eleventh
Amendment’s text.6
B. Seminole’s reasoning was inconsistent
with the founding generation’s treatment
of common law doctrines.
If the constitutional principle of state sovereign
immunity cannot rest on the Eleventh Amendment,
then it must come from somewhere else. The most
plausible “somewhere else” is the common law. Justice
Scalia argued in Union Gas that “the doctrine of
sovereign immunity . . . was part of the understood
4

Id. at 1750.

5

Id.

One scholar has suggested that broad notions of state
sovereign immunity can rest on the meaning of “state” as it
appears throughout the constitutional text. See Michael B.
Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The
Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and
Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819, 821
(1999). But the text doesn’t do any actual work in this
interpretation, see Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the
Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601,
1624-26 (2000), and it is far from clear that immunity was
part of the “linguistic” meaning of “state” in the late
eighteenth century, see Steven E. Sachs, Constitutional
Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1872 (2012).
6
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background against which the Constitution was
adopted, and which its jurisdictional provisions did
not mean to sweep away.” Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). This argument has been
taken up more recently by Professors William Baude
and Steven Sachs, who see state sovereign immunity
as a “constitutional backdrop”—a survival of the
English common law that the Constitution did not
abrogate and that Congress lacks power to change.7
Because these scholars offer the most conceptually
clear defense of an extra-textual principle of state
immunity, we consider their view in some detail.
Amici agree that the common law forms a legal
“backdrop” to the Constitution that generally
continues in effect unless and until it is modified by
positive law. Strong “clear statement” rules, of the sort
that restrain all abrogation of state immunity, see
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
242 (1985), make sense on this ground.8 Likewise, it
makes sense to hold that no state has power to alter
another state’s preexisting immunities. See Franchise
See William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the
Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2017); Sachs,
supra, at 1868-75.
7

See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in
Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 936-37
(1992) (defending the canon disfavoring broad
constructions of statutes in derogation of the common law);
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms,
83 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 123-27 (2004) (arguing that “clear
statement” rules offer strong protection for state
autonomy).
8

9
Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485
(2019). But Seminole’s further step—which makes
these common law rules impervious even to a clear
statutory override—is insupportable. Neither Justice
Scalia in Union Gas nor Professors Baude and Sachs
have addressed the care with which the founding
generation considered precisely how—and to what
extent—the American legal systems should absorb
common law norms.
It was the states, not the national government, that
generally “received” the common law.9 Each state did
so through a positive act—usually state constitutional
provisions, but sometimes state statutes or state court
decisions.10 Moreover, as Justice Story noted, early
Americans “brought with them and adopted only that
portion [of the English common law] which was
applicable to their situation.” Van Ness v. Pacard, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829). These reception
measures generally made clear that common law
principles thus adopted remained subject to legislative
alteration.11
See, e.g., Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of
Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791
(1951).
9

10

See id. at 798-800.

See, e.g., N.J. Const. art. XXII (1776) (“[T]he common law
of England . . . shall remain in force, until [it] shall be
altered by a future law.”); Seminole, 517 U.S. at 162
(Souter, J., dissenting) (collecting early provisions); Hall,
supra, 4 VAND. L. REV. at 798-89; GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 299300 (1969).
11
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In this, of course, the common law received by the
states was just like the common law of the mother
country, whose doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty
made every common law principle subject to legislative
alteration.12 But subordination of common law
principles to legislation proved central to the debate
about receiving the common law into federal law.
Some critics of the proposed Constitution, like George
Mason, complained that it failed to secure “the
enjoyment of the benefit of the common law.”13
Federalists replied that to do so would effectively
destroy the notion of limited and enumerated powers,
as the common law extended to all subjects.14 Even
worse, Federalists contended, “a constitutional
reception of the common law would leave it
‘immutable,’ incapable of legislative revision.”15
Instead, they constitutionalized particular common
law rights, like trial by jury or the writ of habeas
corpus, while eschewing a general reception.16
See, e.g., THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 336-37 (5th ed. 1956).
12

George Mason, Objections to This Constitution of
Government, in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 637 (Max Farrand ed. 1911). See
Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1256-57 (1985).
13

See Jay, Part Two, supra, at 1259 (quoting Madison to
the effect that a general reception of the common law
“would have broken in upon the legal Code of every State”).
14

15

Id. at 1258-59 (quoting Edmund Randolph).

See Harry W. Jones, The Common Law in the United
States: English Themes and American Variations, in
16

11
Later, the debate over federal reception of the
common law resurfaced in relation to claims by the
Adams administration that a general body of federal
common law supported the validity of the Alien and
Sedition Acts.17 James Madison’s critique of that
argument rejected any general notion of federal
common law—in particular, because if such a common
law were part of the Constitution, it would be immune
from legislative alteration:
[T]he consequence of admitting the common
law as the law of the United States, on the
authority of the individual States, is as
obvious as it would be fatal. As this law relates
to every subject of legislation, and would be
paramount to the Constitutions and laws of
the States, the admission of it would
overwhelm the residuary sovereignty of the
States, and by one constructive operation new
model the whole political fabric of the
country.18
Each of these episodes—the state reception statutes,
the constitutional ratification debates, and the Alien
POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY 123-24
(Harry Jones ed. 1976).
See Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part
One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1077-83 (1985).
17

Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts, in James Madison,
WRITINGS 608, 640 (Jack Rakove ed. 1999) (1800); see also
id. at 639 (“If . . . the common law is established by the
Constitution, it follows that no part of the law can be
altered by the legislature.”); Jay, Part One, supra, at 109091.
18

12
and Sedition Act controversy—make clear that
incorporation of common law principles into American
law did not simply go without saying. Early Americans
were careful to receive only so much of the common
law as was useful in their particular states’
circumstances, to receive it almost entirely as state
law rather than federal law, and to ensure that
common law principles would be susceptible to
legislative override.19
Without addressing this history, Professors Sachs
and Baude assert that the Constitution denied
Congress power to alter the common law principle of
sovereign immunity. They ground this limitation in
the Necessary and Proper Clause, suggesting that
“abrogating sovereign immunity is one of the ‘great
and important’ or ‘great substantive and independent’
In Seminole, the majority opinion sought to ground state
sovereign immunity in “the jurisprudence in all civilized
nations,” rather than in the common law of England. 514
U.S. at 69. The jurisprudence on which Seminole relied
made no such distinction, although it used both terms. See
Hans, 134 U.S. at 15 (emphasizing that a suit against a
states by its own citizen was “not known . . . at the common
law”). In any event, where the Constitution does
incorporate a broader international jurisprudence—in the
Admiralty Clause, for example—that jurisprudence has
always been subject to legislative alteration. See, e.g., The
Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.)
(observing that “the Court is bound by the law of nations”
until “an act be passed” by Congress). In Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 714-28 (2004), for example, this
Court treated the extent to which the “law of nations”
would be cognizable by American courts as pervasively
subject to congressional choice.
19

13
powers that falls outside of the implied powers of
Article I.”20 Yet each scholar presents this claim as an
invitation to further inquiry—not as a historical
demonstration.21
But striking down an act of Congress requires
more. The Framers’ insistence on legislative control
over the common law, as well as their concern that
adopting the common law might perpetuate
monarchical principles inappropriate for a republic,22
undermine any argument that abrogation is an
“improper” power. Moreover, as we discuss in the next
section, that argument is also inconsistent with the
Framers’ theory of state sovereignty.
A final problem is that Congress’s power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment through “appropriate”
legislation, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5, is generally
equated with its “necessary and proper” authority

Baude, supra, 103 VA. L. REV. at 15; see also Sachs,
supra, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. at 1874-75.
20

See Baude, supra, at 15 (characterizing this rationale as
“plausible”); Sachs, supra, at 1874 (stating that it “might
be” true).
21

See, e.g., Madison, Alien and Sedition Acts, supra, at 639
(worrying that “an indefinite admission of the common law
. . . might draw after it the various prerogatives making
part of the unwritten law of England”); see also Letter from
James Madison to George Washington (Oct. 18, 1787), in
WRITINGS, supra, at 140, 141 (noting with approval that
“every State has made great inroads & with great propriety
on this monarchical code”) (emphasis in original).
22
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under Article I.23 Adopting the scholars’ theory that
abrogation is inherently “improper”—which this Court
has never done—would thus call into question this
Court’s unanimous and unbroken line of cases holding
that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity
when enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments. See,
e.g., Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (“We think that
Congress may, in determining what is ‘appropriate
legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private
suits against States or state officials which are
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.”).
C. Seminole’s reasoning was inconsistent
with the founding generation’s view of
state sovereignty.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity applies
straightforwardly in a legal system with one unitary
sovereign. But as Justice Kennedy observed, “[t]he
Framers split the atom of sovereignty.” U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). In the Federalists’ political
theory, ultimate sovereignty “resides in the PEOPLE,
as the fountain of government.”24 Accordingly, the
See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966);
Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A
Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153,
178 & n. 153 (1997).
23

1 PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
1787-1788, at 302 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick D.
Stone eds., 1888) (quoting James Wilson); see generally
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE
L. J. 1425, 1435-37 (1987).
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sovereign People “can distribute one portion of power
to the more contracted circle called State
governments; they can furnish another portion to the
government of the United States.”25 Each sovereign’s
prerogatives were limited by this allocation. Hence,
Chief Justice Marshall described the nation and the
states as “each sovereign, with respect to the objects
committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to
the objects committed to the other.” McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819).26
From this perspective, the Eleventh Amendment’s
repudiation of Chisholm makes sense. Chisholm
involved a claim for payment of a debt grounded in
state law.27 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 430. Under the
Federalists’ political theory, Georgia was sovereign as
to that law, and the Chisholm majority never
satisfactorily explained why a state should not be
treated as sovereign with respect to a claim under its
own law.28 But as Justice Iredell’s dissent pointed out,
the right answer might be different in a federal case
“relat[ing] to the execution of the . . . authorities of the
general Government (which it must be admitted are
full and discretionary, within the restrictions of the
Constitution itself).” 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 432. In that
25

1 PENNSYLVANIA, supra, at 302 (quoting Wilson).

See also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435
(1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“The United States are
sovereign as to all the powers of Government actually
surrendered; Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all
the powers reserved.”).
26

27

See Amar, supra, at 1472.

28

See id. at 1469-73.
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sort of case, “sovereignty has . . . been . . . delegated to
the United States . . . wherein the separate
sovereignties of the States are blended in one common
mass of supremacy.” Id. at 435. Both the Federalists’
political theory and Justice Iredell’s application of it
in Chisholm thus support Professor Akhil Amar’s
conclusion that “[w]here governments are acting
within the bounds of their delegated ‘sovereign’ power,
they may partake of sovereign immunity; where not,
not.”29
Respect for federalism, in this analysis, suggests
that Congress may lack power to subject states to
damages suits under state law. It also suggests that
courts should not displace traditional state law
immunities, including sovereign immunity, without a
clear statement of Congress’s intent. See Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (presumption against
altering traditional federal balance); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (recognizing
interpretive presumption against displacement of
state law). And other aspects of the Framers’ federal
plan—including the sovereign equality of states, see
Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1493-94—explain why one state
may not displace another state’s immunity. But when
Congress speaks clearly, and acts within its
enumerated powers, it exercises the People’s sovereign
power. The Copyright Act plainly falls within
Congress’s sphere, and so the Framers’ conception of
sovereignty requires state immunity to yield.

29

Amar, supra, at 1490-91, n. 261.
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D. This Court can resolve this case without
considering whether Seminole should be
overruled.
Because Seminole’s holding was inconsistent with
the constitutional text and the founding generation’s
views about sovereignty and the common law, it
should not be extended to bar individual remedies
under another important federal statute. Overruling
that decision, however, would raise difficult and
unnecessary questions of stare decisis. Seminole has
stood for nearly a quarter century, and an extensive
jurisprudence has grown up around it. Amici believe
that this case can be a vehicle for refining Seminole’s
impact without repudiating its central holding.
While the Court’s decisions under Seminole have
remained bitterly divided, this Court has
unanimously embraced the proposition that Congress
may abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455; United States v. Georgia,
546 U.S. 151 (2006). In Georgia, in particular, this
Court unanimously held that an abrogation statute is
valid as applied to particular cases in which the
plaintiff can establish an actual constitutional
violation. That principle resolves this case. And by
insisting on a constitutional as well as a statutory
violation, Georgia effectively redresses the most
serious violations of national sovereignty while
retaining significant safeguards against unwarranted
impositions on state governments.
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion below also narrowed
the scope of Section 5 abrogation by imposing an
additional and unwarranted clear statement
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requirement and by demanding a pattern of past
constitutional violations as a predicate for
congressional legislation. These new doctrines make
prophylactic abrogation under Section 5 extremely
difficult. If this Court chooses to address prophylactic
abrogation, it should reject these doctrinal
innovations.
II. Congress validly abrogated North Carolina’s
sovereign immunity in the CRCA.
This Court has unanimously agreed that Congress
may abrogate state sovereign immunity when it acts
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Such abrogation can happen in two ways: First,
abrogation statutes may have a prophylactic effect,
subjecting states to liability in all cases where they
violate the terms of the statute, so long as that
statute’s terms are “congruent and proportional to the
targeted violation” of the Constitution. Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 374 (2001). Second, even abrogation statutes
that do not meet this standard may be enforced when
the plaintiff can establish not only a statutory
violation but an actual constitutional violation as well.
Georgia, 546 U.S. at 158-59. The latter route provides
the most expeditious way to resolve the present case.
But the CRCA also meets this Court’s “congruence and
proportionality” standard for prophylactic legislation,
properly construed.
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A. North Carolina is subject to damages
liability in this case under this Court’s
holding in United States v. Georgia.
In United States v. Georgia, a disabled inmate of
the Georgia state prison system challenged his
conditions of confinement by suing the state
Department of Corrections and several individual
officers under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Eighth Amendment. See 546
U.S. at 154-55.30 The District Court dismissed the
claims against the individual officers as unduly vague
and all claims against the state defendants as barred
by sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
as to state immunity, but reversed as to the officers,
holding that the plaintiff should be allowed to develop
his claims under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 15556. This Court granted certiorari on the immunity
issue only and reversed in a unanimous opinion by
Justice Scalia. Id. at 157-59.
Justice Scalia explained this result by drawing a
sharp distinction between two different sorts of
abrogation theories:
While the Members of this Court have
disagreed regarding the scope of Congress’s
“prophylactic” enforcement powers under § 5
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132. Congress explicitly abrogated the states’
immunity. See id. § 12202.
30
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of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . no one
doubts that § 5 grants Congress the power to
“enforce . . . the provisions” of the Amendment
by creating private remedies against the
States for actual violations of those provisions.
. . . This enforcement power includes the power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity by
authorizing private suits for damages against
the States.
546 U.S. at 158-59. The Court characterized all of its
previous Section 5 abrogation cases as involving
prophylactic theories, under which the plaintiffs had
alleged only a violation of the statute. Id. at 157-58. It
is not clear whether the plaintiff’s ADA Title II claim
could have prevailed on such a theory. This Court had
upheld prophylactic abrogation under Title II only “as
it applies to the class of cases implicating the
accessibility of judicial services,” Tennessee v. Lane,
541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004), and it had struck down the
ADA’s abrogation with respect to the general
employment discrimination provisions of Title I, see
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368. Nonetheless, because the
plaintiff in Georgia had alleged a violation of not only
Title II but also the Constitution itself, he was entitled
to go forward. “[I]nsofar as Title II creates a private
cause of action for damages against the States for
conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth
Amendment,” this Court explained, “Title II validly
abrogates state sovereign immunity.” 546 U.S. at 159.
This Court has not elaborated on this as-applied
form of abrogation since Georgia. But the courts of
appeals have read Georgia to uphold abrogation
legislation, like the CRCA, whenever the plaintiff can
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establish an actual constitutional violation: “If the
State’s conduct violated both [the statute] and the
Fourteenth Amendment, [the statute] validly
abrogates state sovereign immunity.” Hale v. King,
642 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 2011). On the other hand,
“[i]f the State's conduct violated [the statute] but did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the court
must then determine ‘whether Congress's purported
abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of
conduct is nevertheless valid’” as prophylactic
legislation under the congruence and proportionality
test. Id. (quoting Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159). The upshot
is that “if a plaintiff alleges a statutory violation that
is also an actual constitutional violation, the court
need not examine whether that statute could validly
prohibit facially constitutional conduct under the City
of Boerne test.” National Association of Boards of
Pharmacy v. Board of Regents of the University System
of Georgia, No. 3:07-CV-084 (CDL) 2008 WL 1805439,
at *7 (M.D. Ga. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part on
other grounds, 633 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2011).
The straightforward “as-applied” test from Georgia
handily decides the present appeal. Petitioners have
alleged not only that North Carolina violated the
Copyright Act, but also that this infringement actually
violated the Constitution by depriving them of their
property without due process of law. No one disputes
that the copyrights in question count as “property”
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. And
although this Court noted in Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), that not all
intellectual property infringements amount to
constitutional violations, Petitioners’ claims here are
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not vulnerable to the same difficulties. First,
Petitioners have alleged that the infringement was
intentional rather than merely negligent. See Brief for
Petitioner at 8-9. Compare Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S.
at 645 (noting that “a state actor’s negligent act that
causes unintended injury to a person's property does
not ‘deprive’ that person of property within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause”). And second,
Petitioners have alleged that state law affords them
no remedy. Compare id. at 643 (emphasizing that “a
deprivation of property without due process” occurs
“only where the State provides no remedy, or only
inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its
infringement of their patent”). Indeed, on the
extraordinary facts presented here, the state
legislature went so far as to specifically bar any
remedy for the alleged infringement. See Brief for
Petitioners at 13 (discussing “Blackbeard’s Law,” H.B.
184, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121-25(b)).
This Court should stop there. The CRCA is
constitutional as applied to this case, and this Court
need not consider whether it sweeps too broadly in
other circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 24-25 (1960) (refusing to consider
whether Congress had legislated beyond its Fifteenth
Amendment authority because “if the complaint here
called for an application of the statute clearly
constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, that
should have been an end to the question of
constitutionality”). This Court can wait for another
day to decide whether the CRCA is also valid
prophylactic legislation, as well as whether the
Copyright Clause amounts to a waiver in the “Plan of
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the Convention” under Central Virginia Community
College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
Georgia’s reasoning strikes a sensible balance
between Congress’s concern for statutory enforcement
and the legitimate values of governmental autonomy
and solvency that sovereign immunity protects. A
plaintiff’s ability to establish not only a statutory
violation but a constitutional one as well is not a
perfect proxy for the severity of the violation, but it
does provide a decent filter. And certainly Georgia
provides no basis for broad abrogations in the areas of
contract or tort law that might threaten the states’
financial viability—the key historical concern of
sovereign immunity law.31 Georgia is not only the
narrowest available ground for decision here, but also
the one that sensibly balances the legitimate concerns
on each side of the immunity debate.
B. Congress’s
prophylactic
statutory
abrogation of state sovereign immunity in
the CRCA should be upheld.
This Court may also resolve this case as an
instance of prophylactic abrogation designed to
prevent or remedy deprivations of federal intellectual
property rights without due process of law. In this
case, the Fourth Circuit made two innovations that
See Ernest A. Young, Its Hour Come Round at Last? State
Sovereign Immunity and the Great State Debt Crisis of the
Early Twenty-First Century, 35 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
593 (2012) (arguing that the core purpose of state sovereign
immunity is to ward off existential threats to state solvency
like the Revolutionary war debts in Chisholm or the
Reconstruction bonds in Hans).
31
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undermined this Court’s Section 5 abrogation
jurisprudence. First, the court of appeals required that
Congress must not only speak clearly with respect to
its intent to abrogate the states’ immunity, but also
that it must explicitly specify the correct
constitutional power when doing so. Second, the
Fourth Circuit required that Congress must have
considered a sufficiently extensive “pattern” of past
constitutional violations, whether or not such
violations exist outside the legislative record or have
developed since Congress acted. Both these holdings
were error, and both undermine the viability of
Section 5 abrogation.
1. Congress need not explicitly invoke
Section 5 in order to abrogate state
immunities under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In the present case, the Fourth Circuit said flatly
that “[n]either the text of the [CRCA] nor its
legislative history indicates any invocation of
authority conferred by § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. And without such an invocation, the Act
cannot effect a valid abrogation under § 5.” 895 F.3d
at 351. This holding added an additional hoop for
Congress to jump through when overriding state
sovereign immunity. This Court has already required
that
“Congress
may
abrogate
the
States’
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal
court only by making its intention unmistakably clear
in the language of the statute.” Atascadero, 473 U.S.
at 242. The Fourth Circuit transformed this stringent
requirement into a double clear statement rule:
Congress must now not only make its intent to
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abrogate the States’ immunity unmistakably clear
(which all admit Congress did in the CRCA), but it
must also clearly specify the particular enumerated
power upon which it relies to do so. Even if one
generally favors clear statement rules,32 this double
one goes too far.
The Court plainly rejected this sort of reasoning in
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983):
It is in the nature of our review of
congressional legislation defended on the
basis of Congress's powers under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment that we be able to
discern some legislative purpose or factual
predicate that supports the exercise of that
power. That does not mean, however, that
Congress need anywhere recite the words
“section 5” or “Fourteenth Amendment” or
“equal protection,” for “[t]he constitutionality
of action taken by Congress does not depend
on recitals of the power which it undertakes to
exercise.”
Id. (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476–
478 (1980) (plurality opinion), and quoting Woods v.
Miller, 333 US. 13, 144 (1948)). Likewise, this Court
demanded no such “clear statement” of reliance on the
Section Five power in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); rather, it determined
simply that Congress had clearly stated its intent to
subject the States to damages liability under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, see id. at 73-78,
See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process
Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1364-66 (2001).
32
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and then went on to assess whether that statute could
pass City of Boerne’s “congruence and proportionality”
test, see id. at 80-91. This Court applied no double
clear statement rule of the sort fashioned by the
Fourth Circuit.33
In the CRCA’s case, it is easy to understand why
Congress did not invoke Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment: Under the law as it stood
when the CRCA was enacted, Congress did not have
to rely on that power. Prior to this Court’s decision in
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242, the Copyright Act had
generally been understood to render states liable for
copyright infringements.34 Congress enacted the
CRCA in 1990 to provide the explicit statement that
Atascadero demanded. See H.R. Rep. 101-282(I) (Oct.
13, 1989). But this Court had held the year before that
Congress may abrogate the States’ immunity
pursuant to its ordinary Article I powers. See
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). It
thus did not matter whether abrogation rested on the
Commerce Clause, the Copyright Clause, or the
Reconstruction Amendments until Seminole in 1996,
This Court did say that Congress should explicitly invoke
its Section Five powers in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
469-70 (1991). But the Court’s task in Gregory was to
construe the reach of Congress’s statute—an enterprise
that this Court viewed in Wyoming as quite different from
“adjudg[ing] its constitutional validity.” 460 U.S. at 243
n.18.
33

See Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of
2003: Hearing on H.R. 2344 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, 108th
Cong. 90-91 (2003) (testimony of Paul Bender).
34
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well after the CRCA had become law. To hold that
Congress must revisit this issue a third time in order
to specify under which enumerated power it seeks to
abrogate is to play Lucy with Charlie Brown’s football.
The Fourth Circuit’s holding will affect the validity
of any statute that might be defended under the
Section Five power. It will encourage courts to
speculate whether other powers must also be
specifically invoked in order to ground a federal
statute.
It invites the question whether, when
Congress does invoke Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it may nonetheless miscarry by not
properly stating the particular constitutional theory
that may sustain the legislation. And Congress may
respond by simply inserting legislative history
invoking a blunderbuss-shot of constitutional
authorities for courts to sort out later. Instead, this
Court should return to the settled rule that “the
constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not
depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to
exercise.” Woods, 333 U.S. at 144.
2. Congress need not show a pattern of
past violations at the time that it
legislates.
The Fourth Circuit did not consider whether the
terms of the CRCA were congruent and proportional
to the Due Process Clause’s protections for property.
Rather, like several other circuits, the Fourth Circuit
erected an additional hurdle for Section Five
legislation by ruling that Congress may not legislate
under that power if the legislative record does not
show a pattern of past constitutional violations by the
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States.35 Finding that “the record before Congress
contained at most a dozen incidents of copyright
infringement by States that could be said to have
violated the Fourteenth Amendment,” the court of
appeals concluded that “[t]his evidence plainly falls
short of establishing the ‘widespread and persisting
deprivation of constitutional rights’ that is required to
warrant prophylactic legislation under § 5.” 895 F.3d
at 353 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
526 (1997)). To make matters worse, the Fourth
Circuit disregarded evidence relied upon by the
district court that such violations have radically
increased in the years since Congress enacted the
CRCA. See id. at 353-54. Amici agree with Petitioners
that, because there is a very large record of
unconstitutional state deprivations of copyright
interests, the CRCA handily vaults any “pattern”
hurdle. See Brief for Petitioners at 46-53. But Section
Five imposes no such requirement,36 and this case
affords this Court a valuable opportunity to clarify
that point.
No other enumerated power of Congress is thought
to entail such a requirement. If Congress wishes to
prohibit a particular activity under the Commerce
Clause, it need not show that anyone is already
engaging in such activity or that the activity would
See also Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 60506 (5th Cir. 2000).
35

See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the
Federal Government? State Sovereign Immunity, the
Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEXAS L.
REV. 1551, 1578-81 (2003).
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harm the interstate economy. If Congress wished to
set safety standards for driverless cars, for example, it
might be prudent to wait until some such cars had
been introduced, but nothing in the Constitution
would foreclose it from regulating wholly
prospectively.
So, too, with the Section 5 power. In Boerne, this
Court made clear that Section 5 confers authority to
“remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions.” 521 U.S.
at 519 (emphasis added). If Congress wished to
prevent states from adopting new genetic screening
technologies in hiring state employees, it could do so
under the Section 5 power even if no state had yet
adopted those technologies; the only question would be
whether use of the technology by a state would
actually violate the Fourteenth Amendment. To hold
otherwise would force this Court to consider a host of
unanswerable questions, such as exactly how many
past violations are necessary to “activate” the Section
Five power, or whether state violations occurring after
Congress enacts a statute count towards validating
that statute under Section 5.
To be sure, a legislative record remains relevant for
some purposes. This Court emphasized the lack of a
legislative record showing instances of state violations
of patent rights in Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 64041, and in some cases upholding Section 5 legislation
it has noted the presence of such a record, see, e.g.,
Lane, 541 U.S. at 524-29. Especially where Congress
acts prophylactically under Section 5, prohibiting
some subset of constitutionally-permissible conduct in
order to get at constitutionally forbidden conduct, a
record of past state conduct can help a court assess the
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relative proportions of those two classes of conduct.
But as this Court has noted in its Commerce Clause
cases, legislative findings and testimony can be
helpful in determining whether a statute meets
constitutional requirements, but they are not
requirements in their own right. See United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612, 614 (2000).
Moreover, Georgia made clear that where Congress
need not rely on its ability to act prophylactically—in
that case, where actually unconstitutional conduct is
at issue—there is no requirement that Congress show
such conduct to be frequent in order to prohibit it. See
546 U.S. at 158-59 (upholding abrogation in cases of
actual constitutional violations without considering
whether past violations had occurred). If past
constitutional violations were an independent
prerequisite for valid Section Five legislation, then the
plaintiff in Georgia could not have succeeded simply
by providing that his own constitutional rights had
been violated.
At least since McCulloch v. Maryland, this Court
has eschewed the sort of “necessity” requirement
adopted by the Fourth Circuit here. Rather, this Court
has “accord[ed] substantial deference to the predictive
judgments of Congress” in determining what problems
warrant legislative solutions and how those solutions
should be framed. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997). Courts generally
evaluate only whether the substance of federal
legislation falls within the scope of an enumerated
power—not whether events in the world have
rendered that legislation necessary. A court’s view
that legislation responds to no pressing current
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circumstance is only a hair’s breadth away from a view
that the law is simply bad policy—and neither is a
sound basis for declaring the law unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference
& Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941) (“We are not
concerned . . . with the wisdom, need, or
appropriateness of the legislation.”). In any event,
Congress could surely conclude that some
unconstitutional conduct is so egregious—a
resurgence of lynching, for example—that it should
legislate to prevent it in advance even if the conduct
has not yet materialized.
Finally, even if Section 5 legislation depends on
establishing a pattern of state violations, this Court
should reject the Fourth Circuit’s holding that afterenactment violations do not count. See 895 F.3d at
353. The District Court, in upholding the CRCA’s
abrogation provision, had relied on extensive evidence
of state copyright infringements that occurred after
the CRCA’s enactment. This stands to reason. The
CRCA clarified what had been the prior
understanding that the Copyright Act abrogated state
sovereign immunity.37 But it is hardly surprising that
state violations proliferated after Florida Prepaid held
in the analogous patent context that states could
violate federal intellectual property rights without
fear of monetary sanction. See Brief for Petitioners at
44-45. Critically, the Fifth Circuit extended that
ruling to copyrights just a year later. See Chavez, 204
F.3d at 607-08. One should expect state copyright
See Testimony of Paul Bender, Hearing on H.R. 2344,
supra.
37
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violations to multiply further if this Court affirms the
Fourth Circuit. But it makes little sense to disable
Congress from deterring such violations until the
problem has festered for a sufficient period of time.
The question is whether the law is constitutional now,
not when enacted.
As we have already suggested, the benefit of a
record of violations is to assist the Court in
determining whether Section 5 legislation is
congruent and proportional—that is, whether most
statutory violations are likely to also be constitutional
ones. But it should make no difference whether that
evidence is generated by Congress itself through
hearings at the time of enactment, or whether it is
submitted by the parties to litigation seeking to
enforce the law in question. Congress is not an
administrative agency whose work product is to stand
or fall based on whether it considered the right kinds
of evidence before acting.38 Rather, this Court reviews
legislation simply to determine whether its substance
falls within the bounds of a constitutionallyenumerated power.
The post-CRCA record of state copyright
infringements, ably collected in Petitioners’ brief,
documents Congress’s foresight in moving to abrogate
state sovereign immunity for such violations in 1990.
Cf. A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone,
Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New “On the
Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 329 (2001). To be clear, amici believe that
such “on the record” review would be inappropriate, but do
not read cases like Florida Prepaid to require it.
38

33
That Congress was ahead of events in this instance
surely does not render the act unconstitutional. This
Court
should
either
uphold
the
CRCA’s
constitutionality or remand to the court of appeals for
reconsideration in light of the post-enactment
evidence of state infringements.
Conclusion
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit should be reversed.
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